Ibn Sina/Avicenna

Ibn Sinas repute brought him the title the leading eminent scholar (al-Shayk al Rais). debate the signifi thunder mugce of his philosophic ideas with special focus on his billet amidst his message and introduction, and its role in his proof for God as the demand subsistent. Ibn Sina, or Avicenna, born 980 AD, was a leading polymath of many subjects many of his theories be lock in renowned today 240 of (approximately) 450 works can au whencetic anyy be attributed to him, contributing to mainly practice of medicine and school of thought, but also astronomy, physics, psychology, geology and regular(a) poetry. A devout Islamic and child prodigy, he had memorised the Quran by the age of ten, and chop-chop surpassed his teachers of the Hanafi Sunni school, and by the age of 16 was fully learned in the sciences of his time.After perusal medicine, he cycleed his attention to physics and metaphysics, exercise Aristotles Metaphysics 40 times, until he had memorised it, yet he could not grasp its meaning until reading al-Farabis commentary which enlightened his problems of understanding. He began writing his own talk over on this case and many some others on his travels to Isfahan whilst working as a physician to Kings and other heavy figures, gaining prestige in medical matters and his friendship of school of thought, theology and metaphysics was widely recognised.Even after his death in 1038 AD, his works possess continued to influence philosophical and medical thought his canon of medicine served as the highest medical authority for 600 years, and the translation of kitab al-Shifa (Book of Healing) into Latin served as the beginning point for many other prestigious thinkers, such as doubting Thomas, and this cover will be further looked at here.Avicenna is considered the most famous and powerful of the philosopher-scientists of the Islamic world There ar many other Islamic philosophers that rush attempted to take metaphysics, but Ibn S inas works al superstar systematic entirelyy and consistently focus on both ontological and cosmologic literary program lines that argon not self-contradictory and address the underlying issue of harmonise the Islamic opinion with philosophy. Before Avicenna, falsafa (Arabic Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy) and kalam (Islamic doctrinal theology) were distinct strands of thought, even though a good deal of cross-fertilization took place among them.After Avicenna, by contrast, the two strands fused together and post-Avicennan kalam emerged as a authentically Islamic philosophy, a synthesis of Avicennas metaphysics and Muslim article of faith. This is the immemorial debate for his lasting prestige his ideas in the Book of Healing operose not on medicine, but on the healing of the soul and body, and held two key funda amiable ideas the mark between essence and creative activity, and God as the unavoidable real(a), a doctrine that has previously not been merged successfully.The doctrine of a thing (shay) proved difficult to define for the Mutazilis, as although they let out that a thing can each be existent or non-existent they struggled to define where the non-existent entities lay. Using the Quranic verse of creation our statement to a thing, when we beseech it to be, consist merely in our saying Be and then it is. (The hallowed Quran 1640), we can identify that something can exist in headspring originally it exists in actuality God thought of a thing then willed it into being by saying be and it was. This shows that the idea of the thing existed before its reality, meaning that the Mutazilis were able to conceive of the thingness of detail entities, and their universality (of thingness) can either exist in reality or in mentality. They could not address the idea of non-existent things, (madum) such as a squ are circle, as their im achievableness cannot even exist in the mind. This idea opposes the Sunni theological perspective , where they hold that thingness and human beings are one and the same.They hold the idea of co-extensiveness (where all things are existents, and all existents are things) as they believe that this idea solves the problem of creatio ex nihilo they did not want to give any flexibility to the idea that things existed before creation, or held eternality alongside God. They held that a thing was the sum of all its predicates, one of which was institution a thing could not be without it existing. However, this poses problems for the mankind of things that can besides occur in the mind, for example, a unicorn.There is a split in Sunni philosophy where some believe that a thing can either be considered as extra-mentally existent, (and so exist just as much as they would in actuality) or some believe a thing that entirely exists in the mind simply does not exist whatsoever. This is problematic, as we can all conceive of a unicorn, despite its non-reality, ( in that locationfore it can not simply not exist at all), yet we cannot think of a unicorn existing in the mind on the same level as our own earth. Ibn Sina draws upon al-Farabis appointment that thing and existence cannot be used as the same copulative you cannot ubstitute thing for exists in a sentence in a counselling that can make sense for example, one can easily identify that the statement Zayd exists as a man to be appropriate, but one cannot say Zayd thing as a man, as it is nonsensical. Therefore, Ibn Sina concludes that there is a distinction between thing and existence, and also makes the distinction between existents and non-existents. For Avicenna, there are four kinds of scientific questions. 1) mavin is a question about the existence or non-existence of things. 2) Another is about the whatness of things. 3) And other is about the whichness or thatness of things. ) Also, there is the question about the rationality of things. His distinction between essence and existence not only addresses the problem of the Sunni theologians, but, in his mind, satisfies what a thing is, and that its existence is not a predicate of thingness, and this argument can prove the existence of God as indispensable. For Ibn Sina, existence adds to an essence specific determination external to the essence of a thing existence adds to essence, an essence can be without existing, for example, the demonstration of the unicorn its essence is separate from its existence as we can conceive of it without its actuality.He further explains this with categorising the necessary (wajib) and the possible/contingent (mumkir). Avicenna makes three distinctions concrete existent, a mental existent and that which is uncomplete of these two. A concrete existent is that which adds existence to its essence that is to say that it, as an essence, also has existence. A mental existent is that which has essence, but not existence (such as a unicorn it has essence be arrange we can think of it).That which is neithe r is that which is logically impossible to exist even in the mind, such as a square circle as it is impossible to conceive of such a thing, this does not even have essence. This solves the problem faced by Sunni philosophers, as it highlights the distinction between mental essences without existence and concrete essences with existence. Avicenna continues to argue three further aspects of essences necessary, possible or impossible. Those that are impossible are those that it is illogical to think about, such as square circles, and as we have already shown, these do not have essence OR existence.That which is necessary is so be generate its very essence implies existence its denial would postulate a contradiction, (which we will further explain later). The possible is that which has essence that has possible to exist it can either exist, or not exist. This is what contingent beings are categorised as they have the potentiality to exist, by the cause of another(prenominal)(prenom inal) it cannot exist by dint of itself, as otherwise it would be necessary, and it cannot not exist, as otherwise it would be impossible. Once actualised (through another), concrete existence is added to the essence.Avicenna would argue that mental essences are not concrete existents because they have not been brought into existence by another, so remain as potential essences that could exist, but do not in actuality. So far then, it has been demonstrated that Ibn Sina made the distinction of essences between that which cannot exist, that what can exist if brought into being by another, and that which exists through its own definition of its essence. When a possible essence is actualised through another, and becomes a concrete existent, it becomes necessary through another it must be caused by a cause external to itself.This in turn, must also be caused by another previous external cause, and so on. However, these causes cannot continue ad infinitum- there must be an external ca use that itself is not caused by any other being external to itself, that is to say, that the cause is contained within itself, what Avicenna calls necessary through itself. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes, but must be one cause that can sustain and contain all possible causes, but itself need not be caused, as its essence itself contains existence, the inevitable Existent God.So then, we have tackled the question previously posed of the existence or non-existence of things, what they are (possible/necessary), and the thatness (whether it is necessary through another or itself) in turn answering the fourth question set out by Ibn Sina of the cause of things. Proof of Gods existence from this argument stems from the cosmological argument an idea from Aristotle that there must be a First lawsuit in order to bring about the causes that cause others.However, Ibn Sina improves this argument by recognising that what something is differs from the fact that it is. Ibn Sinas way of making his point is to say that esse fact of a things existence is an accidental property of things that is a quality it may or may not possess, without changing what it is Previously, philosophers such as Aristotle had only considered the nature of things, quite than setting them apart from their bodily realisation. The distinction Avicenna makes between physical and mental existence is one that Aristotle had trouble in combatting. The most important text of this kind is Avicennas al-Shifa? (The Healing, namely from ignorance). The title was wrongly (but aptly) translated into Latin as Sufficientia, as if Avicennas single countrywide work was a sufficient replacement for the several books of Aristotle This distinction was so important that every philosopher after Ibn Sina had to respond the question was now unornamented that there must be primacy of either essence or existence, as he had distinguished that they were not one and the same.Debate has followed Ibn Sinas argument, that has mainly interpreted two paths Suhrawardi decides that essence is prior to existence, whereas Ibn Arabi believes that only existence is real and essences are how existence presents itself to us. Thus, it has been demonstrated that Ibn Sina was successful in using an argument from reason that signifies God as the one creator, First to cause others, from which we could not possibly exist if it were not for His necessary existence through Himself.This was so intemperate for his time, as it had only been remarked that there previously lay a difference between the necessary and possible. Avicennas distinction between through itself and through another led to the reconciliation of Islamic thought and philosophical reason there lies no contradiction between our own existence as concrete and Gods existence as exclusively other, beyond our conception of contingent.This argument was so influential on both later thinkers due to his ability to draw upon early philosophical ideas and his faith brought together Aristotelian and neo-Platonic philosophy and Islamic theology in a way that made the distinction between theoretical and practical intimacy logically acknowledging that the first cause as a necessary existent can only be a monotheistic God, as all predicates, including that of existence are perfectly contained within the very definition of His essence.This hypothesis is reconcilable with Islamic thought as it signals disenchantment with neo-Platonic thought, developing a more personal philosophy that argues for our own necessary existence (through another), whilst still acknowledging that God is unattainably necessary through Himself. Ibn Sina envisaged a world resting on two pillars a) Greek philosophy and b) Quranic revelation and the virtues of manIbn Sina was a passing spiritual and ethical person, considering that, for him, teaching and learning should lead also to root in faith deeply in the soul of the item-by-item. This meant that eac h individual had meaning for their own life, which they could relate back to God, personally having their own cause rooted in the Divine Necessary Existent. Bibliography * Avicenna Farhang Zabeeh, ( Ed. Trans. ) Avicennas Treatise on Logic Part One of Danesh-Name Alai (a Concise Philosophical encyclopaedia and autobiography) (Martinus Nijoff, the Hague, 1971) * Charles Burnett, Arabic into Latin the reception of Arabic philosophy into Western atomic number 63 in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy, ed. turncock Adamson and Richard C Taylor (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) * F. C. Bauerschmidt, Holy Teaching Introducing the Summa Theologiae of St. doubting Thomas Aquinas (Michigan, Brazos Press, 2005) * Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C Taylor (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) * Sebastian Gunther, Be Masters in That You Teach and Continue to try M edieval Muslim Thinkers on Educational theory in proportional Education Review, Vol. 0, zero(prenominal) 3, (August 2006) Article DOI 10. 1086/503881 Web Resources * Encyclop? dia Britannica Online, s. v. Avicenna, accessed December 11, 2011, http//www. britannica. com/EBchecked/ topic/45755/Avicenna * http//quran. com/ accessed 15/12/11 1 . Encyclop? dia Britannica Online, s. v. Avicenna, accessed December 11, 2011, http//www. britannica. com/EBchecked/topic/45755/Avicenna. 2 . Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed.Peter Adamson and Richard C Taylor (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) p. 92 3 . The Holy Quran 1640 as cited from http//quran. com/16/40 (Sahih International Translation) accessed on 15/12/11 4 . Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna and the Avicennan Tradition in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy pp. 106-107 5 . Avicenna & Farhang Zabeeh (Ed. Trans. ) Avicennas Treatise on Logic Part One of Danesh-Name Alai (a Concise PhilosophicalEncyclopaedia and autobiography) (Martinus Nijoff, the Hague, 1971) p. 5 6 . F. C. Bauerschmidt, Holy Teaching Introducing the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (Michigan, Brazos Press, 2005) p. 57 7 . Charles Burnett, Arabic into Latin the reception of Arabic philosophy into Western Europe in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy, p. 371 8 . Sebastian Gunther, Be Masters in That You Teach and Continue to Learn Medieval Muslim Thinkers on Educational theory in Comparative Education Review, Vol. 50, No. 3, (August 2006) pp. 376 377 Article DOI 10. 1086/503881